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A New Algorithm for Solving Ring-LPN with a
Reducible Polynomial
Qian Guo, Thomas Johansson, Member, IEEE, and Carl Löndahl
Abstract—The LPN (Learning Parity with Noise) problem has
recently proved to be of great importance in cryptology. A special
and very useful case is the RING-LPN problem, which typically
provides improved efficiency in the constructed cryptographic
primitive. We present a new algorithm for solving the RING-LPN
problem in the case when the polynomial used is reducible. It
greatly outperforms previous algorithms for solving this problem.
Using the algorithm, we can break the Lapin authentication
protocol for the proposed instance using a reducible polynomial,
in about 270 bit operations.
Index Terms—Birthday attacks, Fast Walsh-Hadamard Trans-
form, Lapin, LPN, RING-LPN.
I. INTRODUCTION
L IGHT-WEIGHT cryptography is a field of cryptographyinclined towards efficient cryptographic implementations,
as a response to the demands when using highly constrained
hardware in low-cost devices, such as passive RFID-tags and
smart cards.
There are trade-offs to consider, e.g., security, memory and
performance. Different constructions appear in different ends
in the trade-offs; for instance, AES and stream ciphers can be
implemented efficiently in hardware but do not offer provable
security. Quite recently, a new trend arose in this area, building
cryptographic primitives from problems in learning theory.
Problems based on learning theory provide a complexity the-
oretical foundation, on which the security of the cryptosystem
can be based upon. They also have the property of being easy
and efficiently implemented, thereby making them appealing
in light-weight cryptography.
A. The LPN Problem
Being a central problem in learning theory, the LPN
problem (Learning Parity with Noise) has shown to be of
significance in the field of cryptography. It is a supposedly
hard problem1, and is not known to be susceptible to quantum
attacks, unlike some other classically hard problems such as
factoring and the discrete log problem.
The problem can briefly be described as follows. Let s be a
k-dimensional binary vector. We receive a number N of noisy
versions of scalar products of s from an oracle ΠLPN, and our
task is to recover s.
Let y be a vector of length N and let yi = 〈s, ri〉. For
known random k bit vectors r1, r2, . . . , rN , we can easily
reconstruct an unknown x from y using linear algebra. In the
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1LPN with adversarial errors is NP-hard.
LPN problem, however, we receive instead noisy versions of
yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Writing the noise in position i as ei, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and
assuming each Pr [ei = 1] to be small, we obtain
vi = yi + ei = 〈x, ri〉+ ei.
In matrix form, the same is written as v = As + e, where
v =
[
v1 v2 · · · vN
]
, and the matrix A is formed as A =[
r1 r2 · · · rN
]
.
B. Constructions and Variations of LPN
The LPN problem and its variations have been employed
as the underlying hard problem in a wide range of public-key
cryptosystems, identification and authentication protocols, and
zero-knowledge proofs.
The first actual usage of the LPN problem in cryptographic
context can be traced back to 2001, when the Hopper-Blum
(HB) identification protocol [13] was proposed. Being an
intentionally minimalistic LPN based protocol, it was designed
so that it could be executed by humans using only pen and
paper. Much due to its simplicity, it is secure only in the
passive attack model. A couple of years later, Juels and Weis
[14] along with Katz and Shin [15] proposed a modified
scheme, extending HB with one extra round. The modified
scheme was named HB+. Contrary to its predecessor, HB+
was designed to be also secure in the active attack model.
However, it was discovered by Gilbert et al. [11] that the HB+
protocol is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks disproving
active attack model security. The same authors [10] proposed
later on another variation of the Hopper-Blum protocol called
HB#, designed to resist their previous attack [11]. Apart from
repairing the protocol, they solved the long-lived issue with
large key-size or communication complexity by introducing
the use of a slight variation of LPN, called TOEPLITZ-LPN.
Although the use of TOEPLITZ-LPN has no documented
weaknesses, its hardness remains unknown as of today.
During the time from when Hopper and Blum pioneered
the use of LPN until today, a plethora of different proposals
have hit the cryptographic society. Some of the most important
ones are the proposals by Klitz et al. [18] and Dodis et al. [7]
that showed how to construct message authentication codes
based on LPN. The existence of MACs allows one to construct
identification schemes that are provably secure against active
attacks.
Most recently Heyse et al. [12] proposed a two-round
identification protocol called Lapin. The protocol is based on
RING-LPN rather than LPN. Using the inherent properties of
2TABLE I
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS FOR ATTACKING LAPIN WITH REDUCIBLE POLYNOMIAL.
Algorithm Complexity (log2)
Queries Time Memory
Levieil-Fouque [20] 82.0 103.4 100.6
Bernstein-Lange [4] 79.3 102.9 97.9
Our attack (search) 63 71.9 70.0
Our attack (decision) 62 70.0 69.0
rings, the proposed protocol becomes very efficient and well-
suited for use in constrained environments. Briefly, in RING-
LPN, the oracle returns instead elements v, v = s · r + e,
from a polynomial ring F2[x]/(f), i.e., v, s, r, e ∈ F2[x]/(f).
The problem can use either an irreducible polynomial f , of a
reducible one. The choice of a reducible polynomial can make
use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to provide a
very efficient implementation of the cryptographic primitive.
C. Attacks
1) Attacks on Standard LPN: The LPN problem can be
viewed as a general decoding problem in coding theory.
However, the usual choice of parameters for the LPN problem
is deviating from standard parameters for a decoding problem.
The LPN problem typically allows a very large amount of
oracle queries, say N = 260 or even much larger; therefore,
standard algorithms for the general decoding problem, eg.
information-set decoding, will not always be very efficient for
such cases.
Instead, a slightly different type of algorithms have been
suggested, among which we find the BKW algorithm [2]
proposed by Blum et al. It was later refined by Levieil and
Fouque [20]. They gave better attacks by employing the Fast
Walsh-Hadamard Transformation technique, and estimated the
security level of LPN problems with different parameters.
Fossorier et al. [8] suggested an algorithm which further
improved the complexity by utilizing techniques from the area
of fast correlation attacks. In the recent paper by Kirchner [19],
it is proposed to exhaust the search space of the error, rather
than the state. For a certain class of instances, i.e., when the
error rate is low, Kirchner’s technique greatly improves attack
complexity.
Lyubashevsky’s work [21] moved forward in the other
research direction, i.e., when the number of required samples
is bounded. Compared with BKW algorithm, he presented
an asymptotically efficient algorithm with slightly increased
time complexity, i.e., from 2O(n/ logn) to 2O(n/ log logn), while
obtaining much query efficiency.
2) Attacks on Ring-LPN: As the RING-LPN instances
are standard LPN instances, the attacking algorithm for the
latter one is applicable to its ring instance. The pioneering
researchers (eg. Lapin [12]) used the hardness level of the LPN
problem obtained from [20] to measure the security of their
authentication protocol based on the RING-LPN problem.
Almost at the same time, Bernstein and Lange [4] realized
that simply ignoring the ring structure is inappropriate since
this special algebraic property may reveal information about
the secret, and subsequently derived an improved attack taking
advantage of both the ring structure and Kirchner’s technique.
Their attack is generic since it applies to RING-LPN imple-
mented with both reducible and irreducible polynomials, and
is advantageous in the sense of memory costs as well as query
complexity. However, even for the time-optimized case2, with
around 281 bits of memory, it requires quite a large number
of bit operations, i.e., about 288, far away from breaking the
80-bit security of Lapin protocol.
D. Our Contribution
We propose a new algorithm to solve the reducible case
of RING-LPN. By investigating more on the properties of
the ring structure and the reducibility of the polynomial,
we demonstrate that if the minimum weight of the linear
code defined by the CRT transform is low, then the problem
is effortless to solve, hence providing a design criteria for
cryptosystems based on the hardness of RING-LPN with a
reducible polynomial.
We then specify the attack for Lapin [12] and obtain a
complexity gain that makes it possible to break the claimed
80-bit security. In Table I, we compare the complexity of our
algorithm with the best known algorithms3 designed to solve
LPN and RING-LPN. The time complexity is measured in bit
operations and memory complexity is measured in bits.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we
give some preliminaries and introduce the RING-LPN problem
in detail. We describe our new generic attack in Section III
and then present a special version that is efficient for the
proposed reducible instance of Lapin in Section IV. In Section
V we analyze its complexity. The numerical results when the
algorithm is applied on Lapin are given in Section VI and
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. THE RING-LPN PROBLEM
A. Polynomials and Rings
Consider a polynomial f(x) over F2 (simply denoted f ).
The degree of f is denoted by deg f . For any two polynomials
f, g in the quotient ring F2[x], long division of polynomials
tells us that there are unique polynomials q, r such that g =
qf + r. The unique polynomial r ∈ F2[x] with deg r < deg f
is the representative of g in the quotient ring F2[x]/(f) and
2We found that with parameters q = 258.59 , a = 6, b = 65, l = 53 and
W = 4, the complexity is 285.9. The time complexity is slightly lower than
stated in [4].
3We choose parameters to optimize their time complexity.
3is denoted g mod f . We define R to be the quotient ring
F2[x]/(f). So R consists of all polynomials in F2[x] of degree
less than deg f and arithmetics are done modulo f .
If the polynomial f factors such that every factor is of
degree strictly less than f , then the polynomial f is said to
be reducible; otherwise, it is said to be irreducible. When a
reducible polynomial factors as f = f1f2 · · · fm, where fi is
relatively prime to fj for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m and i 6= j, there
exists a unique representation for every r ∈ R according to
the Chinese Remainder Theorem, i.e.,
r 7→ (r mod f1, r mod f2, . . . , r mod fm).
B. Distributions
Let Berη be the Bernoulli distribution and X be a binary
random variable. It is said that X is distributed according to
the Bernoulli distribution with parameter η, if Pr [X = 1] = η
and Pr [X = 0] = 1−Pr [X = 1] = 1− η. Then, the bias ǫ
of X is given by Pr [X = 0] = 12 (1 + ǫ), i.e. ǫ = 1 − 2η .
Let r $← BerRη denote that the coefficients of the ring element
r ∈ R are drawn randomly according to the distribution Berη.
The uniform distribution is denoted U. Whenever we draw an
element uniformly from R, we denote it r $← UR.
C. Formal Definition of Ring-LPN
Being a subclass of LPN, the RING-LPN problem is de-
fined similarly. Fix an unknown value s ∈ R, where s $← UR.
We can request samples depending on s through an oracle,
which we define as follows.
Definition 1 (RING-LPN oracle): A RING-LPN oracle
ΠǫRING-LPN for an unknown polynomial s ∈ R with η ∈ (0, 12 )
returns pairs of the form
(r, r · s+ e) ,
where r $← UR and e $← BerRη . An extreme case is, when η is
exactly 12 , that the oracle Π
0
RING-LPN outputs a random sample
distributed uniformly on R×R.
The problem is now to recover the unknown value s after
a number q of queries to the oracle. We define the search
problem version of RING-LPN in the following way.
Problem 1 (RING-LPN): The search problem of RING-
LPN is said to be (t, q, δ)-solvable if there exists an algorithm
A(ΠǫRING-LPN ) that can find the unknown polynomial s ∈ R in
time at most t and using at most q oracles queries such that
Pr [A(ΠǫRING-LPN ) = s] ≥ δ.
The decisional RING-LPN assumption, states that it is hard
to distinguish uniformly random samples from pairs from the
oracle ΠǫRING-LPN . It can be expressed as follows.
Problem 2 (Decisional RING-LPN): The decision problem
of RING-LPN is said to be (t, q, δ)-solvable if there exists an
algorithm D such that∣∣Pr [D(ΠǫRING-LPN ) = yes]−Pr [D(Π0RING-LPN ) = yes]∣∣ ≥ δ,
and D is running in time t and making q queries.
The hardness of RING-LPN is unknown, but the LPN
problem has been shown to be NP-hard in the worst-case.
The assumption is that RING-LPN is also hard.
In the paper by Heyse et al. [12], it was proposed to
use RING-LPN as the underlying hard problem to build an
authentication protocol. The security relies on the assumption
that RING-LPN is as hard as LPN. However, this is a
conjecture as there is only a reduction from RING-LPN to
LPN, but not the converse. In the following, we show how to
reduce RING-LPN to LPN.
1) Transforming Ring-LPN to LPN: Given the polynomial
r with deg r = t, we denote r as its coefficient vector, i.e.,
if r equals
∑t
i=0 rix
i
, then r =
[
r0 r1 · · · rt
]
. With
this notation, we can define a mapping from one RING-
LPN instance to d standard LPN instances represented in the
following matrix form:
τ : R×R → Ft×t2 × F
t
2
(r, r · s+ e) 7→ (A,As + e) (1)
where the i-th column of the matrix A is the transposed
coefficient vector of r · xi mod f .
2) Ring-LPN with a Reducible f : In this paper we consider
the RING-LPN problem with the ring R = F2[x]/(f), where
the polynomial f factors into distinct irreducible factors over
F2. That is, the polynomial f is written as f = f1f2 · · · fm,
where each fi is irreducible. One of the specified instances
of Lapin [12] uses a product of five different irreducible
polynomials. This instance is the main target for cryptanalysis
in this paper.
D. Basics on Coding Theory
For later use, we end this section by reviewing some basics
on linear codes over the binary field. A linear code C is a k-
dimensional subspace of an n-dimensional vector space. The
elements of C are called codewords and the Hamming weight
of a codeword is defined as number of non-zero entries. The
minimum distance of a linear code is defined as the lowest
weight among the weights of all codewords.
Definition 2 (Generator matrix): A generator matrix G for
C is defined as a k × n matrix whose span is the codeword
space C, i.e.,
C =
{
xG : x ∈ Fk2
}
.
The existence of codes with specific parameters is some-
times guaranteed through the famous GV bound.
Theorem 1 (Gilbert-Varshamov bound): Let n, k and d be
positive integers such that
Vol(n− 1, d− 2) < 2n−k,
where Vol(n− 1, d− 2) =
∑d−2
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
. Then, there exists an
[n, k] linear code having minimum distance at least d.
A random linear code is a code C, where the entries of the
generator matrix G has been selected according to an i.i.d.
uniform distribution. It is known that the minimum distance
d for a random linear code asymptotically follows the GV
bound.
4III. THE NEW ALGORITHM FOR RING-LPN WITH
REDUCIBLE POLYNOMIAL
The purpose of the paper is to describe a new algorithm
(Algorithm 1) for the RING-LPN problem with a reducible
polynomial. We describe the algorithm as follows. First, we
reduce the problem into a smaller one, while keeping the error
at a reasonable level. Then, we further reduce the unknown
variables using well-established collision techniques. The last
step consists of exhausting the remaining unknown variables
in an efficient way.
A. A Low-Weight Code from the CRT Map
Let f = f1f2 · · · fm be a reducible polynomial. In the
following, the underlying irreducible polynomial fi in the
quotient ring F2[x]/(fi) is fixed. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we denote
it as f1 for notational simplicity. Let deg f = t and deg f1 = l.
Proposition 1: There exists a (surjective) linear map from
ψ : R → F2[x]/(f1) determined by the CRT transform.
The linear map can be described as a [t, l] linear code4
with generator matrix Gψ, in which the i-th column is the
transposed coefficient vector of the polynomial xi−1 mod f1.
More specifically, a received sample (r, r · s + e) from
the RING-LPN oracle ΠǫRING-LPN can be transformed into a
considerably smaller instance
ψ : (r, r ·s+e) 7→ (r mod f1, (r mod f1)·(s mod f1)+e mod f1).
For simplicity, we write rˆ = r mod f1, sˆ = s mod f1 and
eˆ = e mod f1. As before, we may write rˆ =
∑l−1
i=0 rˆix
i
, etc.
The new instance has a smaller dimension, as deg f1 <
deg f . However, the distribution of the errors is also changed.
The error distribution in the larger ring is Ber 1
2
(1−ǫ), but in
the smaller ring each noise variable (eˆ = e mod f1) is a
sum of several entries from e. The number of noise variables
that constitutes a new error position (eˆ = e mod f1) depends
entirely on the relation between f and f1.
The following is an example that chooses f1 to be one of
the irreducible polynomials employed in [12].
Example 1: Let deg f = 621, let f1 = x127+x8+x7+x3+1
and assume f1|f . If we consider eˆi to be the i-th entity of the
coefficient vector of eˆ = e mod f1, then we express eˆ0 as a
sum of bits from e as follows,
eˆ0 = e0+ e127 + e246 + e247 + e251 + e254 + e365+
e367 + e375 + e381 + e484 + e485 + e486+
e487 + e489 + e491 + e492 + e495 + e499+
e500 + e501 + e502 + e505 + e508 + e603 + e607.
In particular, we are interested in linear relations that have
as few noise variables from e involved as possible. We use the
Piling-up lemma to determine the new bias in eˆ after summing
up a number of error bits.
Lemma 1 (Piling-up lemma): Let X1, X2, ...Xn be i.i.d
binary variables where each Pr [Xi = 0] = 12 (1 + ǫi), for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
Pr [X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xn = 0] =
1
2
(
1 +
n∏
i=1
ǫi
)
.
4The code is a punctured LFSR code.
For instance, the linear relation given in Example 1 has
weight 26. Hence, by the Piling-up lemma, the bias of eˆ in
that particular position (position 0) is ǫ26, i.e., Pr [eˆ0 = 1] =
1
2 (1− ǫ
26).
Note: We assume that f1 is an irreducible polynomial
throughout the paper. However, this condition is not a neces-
sity, as the essential feature of the new attack is a CRT map.
Actually, it is sufficient if the two polynomials f1 and f/f1 are
coprime; for example, we could set the polynomial with small
degree to be the product of several irreducible polynomials
and obtain a solution as well.
B. Using Low-Weight Relations to Build a Distinguisher
We will now show how to build a distinguisher for RING-
LPN with a reducible polynomial using the CRT transforma-
tion described in the previous section.
In Example 1, we give a linear relation expressing an error
variable eˆ0 in the smaller ring as a sum of relatively few error
variables in the larger ring. In our example, the polynomial
f1 »behaves well«; it is very sparse and yields a low-weight
relation expressing a single noise variable eˆ0. However, this
will generally not be the case: it may be very difficult to find
a desired linear relation with few error variables.
We observe an interesting connection between this problem
and searching for codewords with minimum distance in a
linear code. The CRT transformation can be viewed as


1 mod f1
x mod f1
.
.
.
xt−1 mod f1

 =


g0
g1
.
.
.
gl−1
gl
gl+1
.
.
.
gt−1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=GT
ψ


1
x
.
.
.
xl−1

 ,
where the top part of GTψ is an identity matrix and each row gi,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, is the coefficient vector of the polynomial
xi mod f1.
Thereby, expressing the error polynomial in the smaller ring
e mod f1 =
[
e0 e1 · · · et−1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
def
=eT
GTψ


1
x
.
.
.
xl−1


=
[
eˆ0 eˆ1 · · · eˆl−1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
def
=eˆT


1
x
.
.
.
xl−1

 ,
we obtain
eTGTψ = eˆ
T ⇒ eˆ = Gψe.
Let dψ be the minimum distance of the linear code generated
by Gψ. Then by definition, there exists at least one vector m
5such that the product mGψ has Hamming weight exactly dψ.
More specifically,
〈eˆ,m〉 = 〈e,mGψ〉 ,
where 〈e,mGψ〉 is a sum of dψ noise variables. Thus, accord-
ing to Piling-up lemma we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Estimate of required samples): If the mini-
mum distance of the linear code Gψ is dψ, then the largest bias
of some linear combination of noise variables in the smaller
ring is no less than ǫdψ .
Consequently, in order to determine the security related to
a certain polynomial, we need to determine the minimum
distance of the code generated by Gψ. By applying well-
known algorithms such as information-set decoding (ISD)
algorithms e.g. [24], we can find the minimum distance.
In the example of Lapin, applying ISD algorithms is not
necessary since the polynomials fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5 are very sparse
and admit a very low row-weight of the generator matrix, well
below the GV-bound (which is around 154).
C. Recovering the Secret Polynomial
After determining the strongest bias (〈eˆ,m〉), we move to
the recovery part.
1) Transforming: Recall that deg f1 = l. We ask the oracle
ΠǫRING-LPN for N samples (rˆ(i), sˆ · rˆ(i)+ eˆ(i)) and then convert
each of them to l standard LPN samples by the mapping τ
defined in Section II-C1. Write these samples in the matrix
form (Aˆi, Aˆisˆ + eˆi). Then, multiplying with vector m, we
construct a new LPN sample,
(mAˆi,mAˆisˆ+ 〈eˆi,m〉),
from each RING-LPN sample. According to Proposition 2, the
created samples are with large bias, i.e., no less than ǫdψ .
The overall computational complexity of this step is
bounded by,
C1 = Nl
2 +Nl · (l + 1) = Nl · (2l + 1).
2) Birthday: Put these new samples in a data structure
that can be accessed in constant time (e.g., a hash table),
indexed by its last k entries of the vector mAˆi. Then a
collision between vectors mAˆi and mAˆj (denoted ˆˆri and ˆˆrj ,
respectively),
(ˆˆri, ˆˆri · sˆ+ 〈eˆi,m〉) + (ˆˆrj , ˆˆrj · sˆ+ 〈eˆj,m〉) = (rˆ
′, rˆ′ · sˆ+ eˆ′),
yields a vector rˆ′ that has at most l−k nonzero positions. The
number of such samples is approximately M = N2/2k. The
new samples, such as (rˆ′, vˆ′), depend only on l−k coefficients
of the secret sˆ and has a bias that is
ǫ′ = ǫ2dψ .
Calculating the divergence between the distribution of error in
(rˆ′, vˆ′) and the uniform distribution, we find that the number
of samples required is M ≥ 1/ǫ4dψ .
Storing the N LPN samples uses lN bit-operations, and
performing the birthday procedure requires lN2/2k bit-
operations. Thus, the total complexity of this step is,
C2 = Nl · (1 +
N
2k
).
Thus, at this point, we have generated M vector samples
(rˆ′i, vˆi). All rˆ′i vectors have dimension no more than l− k as
we cancelled out k bits of rˆ′i. Hence, it is enough to consider
only l − k bits of sˆ, i.e., we assume that sˆ is of dimension
l − k. We are then prepared for the final step.
3) Distinguishing the Best Candidate: Group the samples
(rˆ′i, vˆi) in sets L(rˆ′i) according to rˆ′i and then define the
function fL(rˆ′i) as
fL(rˆ
′
i) =
∑
(rˆ′
i
,vˆi)∈L(rˆ′i)
(−1)vˆi .
The Walsh transform of fL is defined as
F (sˆ) =
∑
rˆ
′
i
fL(rˆ
′
i)(−1)
〈sˆ,rˆ′i〉.
Here we exhaust all the 2l−k candidates of s by computing
the Walsh transform.
Given the candidate sˆ, F (sˆ) is the difference between the
number of predicted 0 and the number of predicted 1 for the
bit vˆ′i + 〈sˆ, rˆ′i〉. If sˆ is the correct guess, then it is distributed
according to Ber 1
2
(1−ǫ2dψ ); otherwise, it is considered random.
Thus, the best candidate sˆ0 is the one that maximizes the
absolute value of F (sˆ), i.e. sˆ0 = argmax
sˆ∈F l−k
2
|F (sˆ)|, and
we need approximately ǫ4dψ samples to distinguish these
two cases. Note that false positives are quickly detected in
an additional step and this does not significantly increase
complexity.
We employ Fast Walsh-Hadamard Transform technique to
accelerate the distinguishing step. For well-chosen parameters,
the complexity is approximately,
C3 = (l − k)2
l−k.
Algorithm 1 Partial recovery of RING-LPN
(Preprocessing) Determine the minimum weight dψ of the1
linear code generated by the CRT transformation and find its
corresponding linear relation m.
Ask the oracle ΠǫRING-LPN for N samples, and then transform2
each of them to a standard LPN sample with the largest bias,
which is no less than ǫdψ .
Use the Birthday technique to reduce the secret length at the3
cost of decreasing the bias.
Perform Fast Walsh-Hadamard Transform on the remaining4
l − k bits of sˆ.
Output the sˆ0 that maximizes the absolute value of the5
transform.
From the new algorithm, there are some important con-
sequences to consider when choosing parameters to thwart
our attack. We give some very brief comments, assuming that
every smaller ring is of approximately the same size:
1) Choosing a large number of factors in f seems a bit dan-
gerous, as the dimension of the code Gψ becomes small.
In our attack we used a birthday argument to reduce the
dimension of sˆ, but this might not be necessary if the
dimension is already very low. Instead we may search
for special rˆ (e.g. many rˆ = 1) values that allows quick
recovery of sˆ.
62) One should use irreducible polynomials fi with degree
around nm for 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that for every fi the
corresponding linear code Gψ has minimum distance
as large as possible. From the GV bound, we know
roughly what to expect. However, the GV-bound may
not be asymptotically true for codes generated by the
CRT-transform.
3) Following this line, a necessary but probably insufficient
condition on ǫ is that 1/ǫ4dψ ≥ 2b for b-bit security5.
IV. THE IMPROVED VERSION FOR THE PROPOSED
INSTANCE OF LAPIN
In [12], Heyse et al. employ the following reducible poly-
nomial,
f =
(
x
127 + x8 + x7 + x3 + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1
·
(
x
126 + x9 + x6 + x5 + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2
·
(
x
125 + x9 + x7 + x4 + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f3
·
(
x
122 + x7 + x4 + x3 + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f4
·
(
x
121 + x8 + x5 + x1 + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f5
,
as the underlying structure of the quotient ring R. This
parameter setting is then adopted in a more recent paper
[9] by Gaspar at al., to show that the original protocol and
its hardware variant, Mask-Lapin, have much gain, compared
with the implementation from block ciphers (e.g., AES), in
the sense of resisting power analysis attacks by masking.
However, in the sense of thwarting the new attack of this
paper, it is not a good selection. We give two reasons as
follows.
• As stated previously, for any polynomial fi (1 ≤ i ≤
5), the generator matrix Gψ of the corresponding code
is sparse, hence yielding that we could roughly adopt
one row vector in Gψ as its minimum weight codeword.
Then, the vector m is of Hamming weight 1 and we
could save the computational cost for linearly combining
several samples to form a new one with the largest bias.
• Secondly, for the Lapin instance, the largest bias always
holds at the last row of the generator matrix Gψ, when
modulo operation is taken over each irreducible factor.
Furthermore, for RING-LPN samples (rˆ(i), sˆ · rˆ(i)+ eˆ(i)),
if we find collisions on the last k positions of rˆ(i) (k is
larger than 10), then the last row vector in the matrix
form of the merged sample (rˆ′, rˆ′ · sˆ+ eˆ′) is of the form[
0 . . . 0 rˆ′l−k−1 rˆ
′
l−k−2 · · · rˆ
′
0
]
. (2)
This vector can be read from the polynomial rˆ′ directly,
without any computation cost.
Therefore, we could present a specific algorithm for solving
the Lapin instance, see Algorithm 2, which is more efficient
than the generic one. After determining the weight w of the
last row vector in the generator matrix Gψ , we ask the oracle
ΠǫRING-LPN for N samples (rˆ(i), sˆ · rˆ(i) + eˆ(i)) and search for
5This is just one concern as there may be many other aspects to be taken
into consideration that will make the problem solvable. For instance, if dψ
and ǫ are very large the constraint can be satisfied while the problem in a
larger ring remains easy.
collisions by the last k coefficients of rˆ directly. Then, for each
collision represented by a merged RING-LPN sample (rˆ′, vˆ′),
we construct a new standard LPN sample, where the vector is
generated by (2), and the observed value is the coefficient of
xl−1 in the polynomial vˆ′. These samples are with the largest
bias. The distinguishing step is the same as that in the generic
algorithm and we present the detailed complexity analysis and
numerical results in the consecutive sections.
Algorithm 2 Improved partial key recovery for Lapin
(Preprocessing) Find the weight w of the (l − 1)-th row in the1
generator matrix of the CRT transformation.
Ask the oracle ΠǫRING-LPN for N samples, index them by the2
last k coefficients of rˆ, and then search for all collisions
(rˆ′, rˆ′ · sˆ+ eˆ1 + eˆ2) = (rˆ1, sˆ · rˆ1 + eˆ1) + (rˆ2, sˆ · rˆ2 + eˆ2),
where the last k coefficients of rˆ1 and rˆ2 are the same.
Generate standard LPN samples from the RING-LPN samples,3
and then perform Fast Walsh-Hadamard Transform on l− k bits
of sˆ.
Output the sˆ0 that maximizes the absolute value of the4
transform.
V. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Having introduced the two versions in detail, we now
estimate their complexity. It is straightforward that the generic
algorithm (Algorithm 1) costs C = C1 + C2 + C3 bit-
operations. But analyzing the improved attacking complexity
for the proposed instance in Lapin is more attractive, which
is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (The complexity of Algorithm 2): Let w be the
weight of the last row in the CRT transformation matrix Gψ.
Then, the complexity of Algorithm, denoted C∗, is given by
C∗ = l · (N +N2/2k) + (l − k)2l−k, (3)
under the condition that N2/2k ≥ 1ǫ4w .
Proof: We analyze step by step: 1) First, we store the
samples received from N oracle calls into a table using lN
bit-operations. 2) Clearing k bits in a collision procedure
yields N2/2k samples and can be performed in lN2/2k bit-
operations. As the required standard LPN instance can be
read directly from the RING-LPN instance, the transformation
has no computational cost. 3) Afterwards, we perform a
Fast Walsh-Hadamard Transform. If the number of unknown
bits l − k is at least log2
(
N2/2k
)
, then the complexity is
(l−k)2l−k. This is the final step. Summarizing the individual
steps yields C∗ which finalizes the proof.
VI. RESULTS
We now present numerical results of the improved partial
key recovery attack on the authentication protocol Lapin [12].
The attack we describe concerns the instance of Lapin using
the degree 621 polynomial f and with the parameter η = 16 .
As claimed in [12], this given instance is designed to resist the
best known attack on RING-LPN within the complexity 280.
However, we have shown that it is possible to greatly improve
the attack complexity. The improvements can be seen in Table
II.
7TABLE II
THE COMPLEXITY FOR ATTACKING EACH MODULUS OF THE PROPOSED INSTANCE USING REDUCIBLE POLYNOMIAL f .
Polynomial fi Parameters log2 C∗
k w log2N
x127 + x8 + x7 + x3 + 1 65 26 63 70.56
x126 + x9 + x6 + x5 + 1 63 26 62 70.30
x125 + x9 + x7 + x4 + 1 63 26 62 69.96
x122 + x7 + x4 + x3 + 1 60 27 62 75.02
x121 + x8 + x5 + x1 + 1 58 29 63 71.31
For the distinguishing attack, the complexity is only 269.96.
For actual recovery of the secret polynomial, we need all
five coordinates in the CRT representation, which gives an
upper bound on the security that is roughly 275.05. However,
to solve this search problem, we describe a specified approach
presented in the appendix that reduces the complexity to about
271.88. A comparison with previous algorithms is given in
Table I in the introduction.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed a new generic algorithm to solve the
reducible case of RING-LPN. By exploiting the ring structure
further, our new algorithm is much more efficient than previ-
ous algorithms, enough to break the claimed 80-bit security
for one of the two proposed instances of Lapin.
We have shown that a linear code arising from the CRT
transform characterizes the performance of this attack through
its minimum distance. This is combined with some standard
techniques of using birthday or possibly generalized birth-
day arguments and efficient recovery through Fast Walsh-
Hadamard transform.
The low-weight property of the polynomials in the Lapin
case makes the problem considerably easier than otherwise and
thus makes Lapin susceptible to our attack. Using really low-
weight irreducible polynomials such as x127 + x+1 can give
rise to linear relations with weight as low as 10 or even less.
We have not seen that such polynomials have been pointed
out as very weak before.
The description of the new algorithm was influenced by
the Lapin case. There are more improvements that can be
described in the general case. One such improvement is the
use of a generalized birthday technique [26]. This will allow
us to consider larger dimensions at the cost of increasing the
noise level. We have also noted that the simple bit-oriented
samples in this paper can be replaced by more complicated
vectorial samples, which will give a stronger bias.
APPENDIX A
LAPIN AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the Lapin two-round authen-
tication protocol. Let R = F2[x]/(f) be a ring and R∗ the
set of units in R. The protocol is defined over the ring R.
Let π be a mapping, chosen such that for all c, c′ ∈ {0, 1}λ,
π(c)−π(c′) ∈ R\R∗ if and only if c = c′. Furthermore, let η ∈(
0, 12
)
be a Bernoulli distribution parameter and η′ ∈
(
η, 12
)
a threshold parameter. The elements R, π : {0, 1}λ → R, η
and η′ are public parameters. The ring elements s, s′ ∈ R
constitute the secret key.
Protocol 1 Lapin two-round authentication
Tag Reader
c
$
← {0, 1}λ
c
←−−−−
r
$
← R∗; e
$
← BerRη
z ← r · (s · π(c) + s′) + e
(r, z)
−−−−−→
if r 6∈ R∗ then reject
e′ ← z − r · (s · π(c) + s′)
if wH (e′) > n · η′ then reject
else accept
Suppose that we have a key-generation oracle; it will give
us the key s, s′ $← R. The secret key is shared among the tag
and the reader. Protocol 1 gives how information is exchanged
between the tag and the reader in Lapin.
APPENDIX B
A SPECIAL SECRET RECOVERY APPROACH
In this section, we describe a better secret recovering
approach on the instance proposed in Lapin with a re-
ducible polynomial. This attack exploits the secret polyno-
mial’s representations in the three relatively easy-attacked
quotient rings F2[x]/(fi), i = 1, 2, 3, to decrypt those in rings
F2[x]/(fi), i = 4, 5, and thus obtains higher efficiency than
simply attacking one ring by another. Actually, it reduces the
attacking complexity from 275.05 to 271.88.
Denote a||b as the concatenation of two vectors a and
b, and (s1 mod f1, s2 mod f2, . . . , s5 mod f5) as the CRT
representation of s. The three-step attack is described as
follows.
We first recover the secret polynomials s1, s2 and s3 in the
corresponding smaller rings. This step costs around 271.88 bit
operations. Then, using these known polynomials, we show
that the secrets s4 and s5 can be recovered with negligible
costs.
The second step is transforming each RING-LPN sample
to its corresponding standard LPN samples. This step will
be tricky as we want to make use of the known information.
Since fi are distinct irreducible polynomials over F2[x], there
exist polynomials ti ∈ R such that s =
∑5
i=1 si · ti and ti ≡
1 mod fi, where i = 1, 2, . . . , 5. Moreover, these polynomials
ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , 5 can be computed efficiently. Then, for each
8sample (r, v), where v = r · s + e, by adding the polynomial
r · (
∑3
i=1 si · ti) to v, we create a new polynomial r · (s4 ·
t4 + s5 · t5) + e, which will be converted to a vector A4s4 +
A5s5+e, where A4(A5) is the matrix whose i-th column is the
coefficient vector of r · t4 ·xi(r · t5 ·xi) mod f . The degree of
s4(s5) is 122(121), thereby yielding that only the first 122(121)
columns of the matrix A4(A5), denoted A′4(A′5), are useful.
We can compute those sub-matrices in 217.2 bit operations for
each RING-LPN sample, thereby economically constructing
621 standard LPN samples (ri4||ri5,
〈
s4||s5, ri4||r
i
5
〉
+ ei) for
i = 0, 1, . . . , 620, where ri4(ri5) is the i-th row in the matrix
A′4(A
′
5).
The last step is to attack a standard LPN problem with
length 243 and error probability 1/6. By Levieil-Fouque
algorithm, the cost is small, i.e., around 257.1 bit operations.
It requires 246.6 standard LPN samples, i.e. 237.3 RING-LPN
ones.
The number of samples in the second step is also bounded
by that required in the final step; the overall cost of the last
two steps, therefore, is no more than 260 bit operations, far less
than that required in the starting step. Thus, it is reasonable to
embrace 271.88 bit operations as the total attacking complexity.
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